En repetidas ocasiones he comentado el cambio que van a suponer para la retribución de los administradores en sociedades cotizadas las modificaciones introducidas por la Ley de Economía Sostenible. En particular, por el cambio consistente en la necesidad de someter a la aprobación de la junta general de accionistas el informe anual de retribuciones, aunque sea con un carácter meramente consultivo. Son actuales las convocatorias de distintas juntas de grandes corporaciones españolas que están incluyendo en el orden del día este punto, no ya porque lo exija la modificación legal en la Ley de Economía Sostenible, sino porque ya se formulaba como recomendación en el Código Unificado de Buen Gobierno llevar a cabo esa modificación. Ahora que la recomendación ha dejado paso a un deber legal imperativo, me plantea dudas el encaje en nuestro Derecho de sociedades de capital una votación con carácter meramente consultivo, tema que abordé en mi debut bloguero en ¿Hay Derecho?
Al hilo de ello, es interesante analizar las dudas que está planteando una medida similar en la América corporativa. En su edición de este domingo, The New York Times incluía un completo artículo bajo el título "The Drought Is Over (at Last for C.E.O.'s)" que llamaba la atención sobre la relevante subida de las retribuciones a los principales consejeros ejecutivos de las grandes corporaciones norteamericanas. Se trata de un artículo realmente interesante por la cantidad de información y de datos que aporta, que permite además enlazar con otros muchos Informes sobre la evolución de la retribución en las sociedades cotizadas norteamericanas. Lo que se debe destacar es la consecuencia que sobre esa boyante situación de nuevas retribuciones adquiere el nuevo marco normativo, que tiene su origen en la introducción de las medidas contempladas en la Ley Dodd-Frank:
“Many if not most of the corporations run by these executives are doing better than they were in the downturn. Many businesses were hit so hard by the recession that even small improvements in sales and profits look good by comparison. But C.E.O. pay is also on the rise again at companies like Capital One and Goldman Sachs, which survived the economic storm with the help of all those taxpayer-financed bailouts.
Against such a backdrop, it’s noteworthy that recent moves to empower shareholders seem to have done little to tamp down corporate enthusiasm for paying top dollar to top executives. This is generally the season when companies hold annual meetings for their shareholders.
Under new rules included in the Dodd-Frank financial regulations, nearly all public companies must now give shareholders a say on executive pay. Analysts and corporate governance experts are wondering how these votes will play out, even though companies are under no obligation to heed their shareholders’ advice”.
La intervención de los accionistas en el marco de la junta con respecto a la retribución de los administradores no está exenta en Estados Unidos de algunas incertidumbres. Así, en ese say on pay permanecen abiertas incertidumbres relativas a, por ejemplo, lo que se considera un porcentaje suficiente para admitir que la política retributiva aplicada no es compartida por los accionistas:
“New government regulations put in place after the financial crisis have emboldened some activist shareholders to try again to rein in compensation they deem excessive and undeserved. Although companies will not be bound by such votes, they will have to disclose the results in reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as how they considered the voting in setting subsequent executive pay.
Still, it remains to be seen whether these changes have any teeth. For “say on pay” votes, there is no standard for what percentage of shareholder votes constitutes an endorsement or a rebuttal of policies. Even the prospect of the public votes, though, appears to have altered the relationship between investors and corporate executives on many discussions in recent months”.
No faltan algunos ejemplos recientes en donde los accionistas ya han expresado una abierta discrepancia con respecto a los sistemas retributivos de los administradores:
“There are some early signs that shareholders are pushing back and demanding to be heard on what they deem as excessive pay packages.
Just weeks into this proxy season, a majority of voting shareholders at four companies have handed rebukes to management over pay plans: Hewlett-Packard, Beazer Homes USA, the Jacobs Engineering Group and Shuffle Master, a maker of casino equipment.
By comparison, in the entire proxy season last year, just three companies –KeyCorp, Occidental Petroleum and the former Motorola (now split into two companies)-received majority negative votes on corporate pay packages”.
Es también atractiva la referencia que se hace sobre el endurecimiento que en el marco de las retribuciones de los administradores de sociedades cotizadas puede provocar la utilización de algunas medidas que ya se contemplaron en la Ley Sarbanes Oxley en el año 2002, que también ha mencionado la normativa europea de estos últimos años, que puede dar lugar a la reclamación a los administradores para que devuelvan cantidades recibidas sobre la base de, por ejemplo, cuentas anuales o estados financieros que posteriormente se revelan inexactos:
“True power for shareholders may come when executives who perform badly or whose companies are accused of fraud are required to forfeit their multimillion-dollar payouts.
Regulators forced just such a concession with the chief executive of Beazer Homes, Ian J. McCarthy. Though he was not charged personally, in a settlement with the S.E.C. last month, Mr. McCarthy agreed to return $6.5 million in compensation that he had received while the company was accused of filing inaccurate financial statements in 2006. Beazer restated its results for that year and resolved the S.E.C.’s claims in 2008 without paying penalties or admitting any wrongdoing.
Such clawbacks have rarely been used, but were a main feature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was passed after extensive frauds at Enron and WorldCom. In late March, investors in Beazer Homes also filed a lawsuit against directors of the company, accusing the board of improperly increasing pay for executives in 2010 despite the company’s $34 million net loss that year. The losses were blamed on poor sales of existing homes and little demand for new ones. Beazer said it would not comment on pending litigation.
CAROL BOWIE, director of research at Institutional Shareholder Services, said that while executive compensation would probably keep rising and outstrip wage increases in the economy, pay packages could be entering a new era of investor scrutiny.
With “say on pay” voting, investors are “in a moment when the rubber meets the road,” Ms. Bowie said. “They have a tool — maybe it’s a blunt one — but it can help them express their frustration and ensure the buck stops with them””.
Madrid, 11 de abril de 2011