En nuestro ordenamiento no se ha producido una expresa definición de lo que cabe entender como interés social. El artículo 226 de la Ley de Sociedades de Capital reproduce la tautología consistente en decir que el interés social debe ser entendido “como interés de la sociedad”. No se quiso acoger normativamente la posición defendida por nuestros Tribunales, conforme a la cual el interés social es el interés común a los accionistas.
A pesar de ello, sigue siendo debatida la remisión exclusiva del interés social a los intereses de los accionistas, en perjuicio de otros titulares de intereses vinculados con la marcha de la sociedad pero que no se aceptan como integrantes del interés social. En esa tendencia a favor de una ampliación o "ilustración" del concepto de interés social destacan las iniciativas legislativas que han introducido los intereses de los stakeholders dentro del interés social (o de términos cercanos como el “propósito” o el “éxito” de la sociedad) que los administradores han de tutelar y promover tutela destaca al respecto el artículo 172 de la Companies Act que dispone:
“A director of a company must act in a way that he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to–
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly between the members of the company”.
Es una posición normativa que se sustenta en consideraciones metajurídicas como las que, desde una perspectiva filosófica, ofrece el reciente artículo de Lilian Miles, “A Philosophical Basis for the `enlightened shareholder value’approach” [Sweet & Maxwell Company law Newsletter, nº 308, 18 de enero (2012), pp.1-6]. En él se aborda y defiende la aplicación a esa descripción del interés social o “success of the company” de distintas construcciones filosóficas a partir de la obra de John Rawls iniciada con su libro Theory of Justice. Lilian Miles conecta esas construcciones con la regulación societaria:
“How is the discussion so far relevant to s.172 as a governance practice? What themes have emerged from the work of scholars who have viewed the relationship between the company and its stakeholders from a Rawlsian perspective? It seems, from the above discussion, that the argument that stakeholders have a more substantial claim against the company than is currently recognised is a plausible one. If we accept that these accounts of company-stakeholder relations as correct, the challenge is then to implement s.172 in a way which gives effect to stakeholder concerns and in appropriate circumstances, allow them to claim against the company. However, although the Companies Act 2006 obliges directors of companies other than small companies to, in conjunction with s.172, prepare an annual business review detailing how they have addressed stakeholders’ needs and concerns, it does not allow stakeholders themselves to bring an action against directors if the duty under s.172 were breached.”
Es una idea que se ha repetido desde la adopción en la Companies Act de esa visión de lo que constituye una gestión acorde con el interés social: v. por todos, el trabajo de Andrew R. Keay, “Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value and All That: Much Ado About Little?” (SSRN, Working Paper Series, January 4, 2010), cuya conclusión, a pesar de su extensión, transcribo igualmente:
“In 2000 it was proclaimed that the Anglo-American corporate governance system based on shareholder primacy had succeeded and European stakeholder systems were converging to the Anglo-American approach, but since then we have had the collapse of Enron, Worldcom etc. in the early years of the decade. Also, in the past two years we have seen the demise of major banks such as Northern Rock in the UK and Lehmann Bros in the US, and the provision of government support for other banks and financial institutions, such that we have the virtual nationalisation of several UK banks. These later developments could well lead to a change of direction as there is much questioning not only of the financial regulatory system in Anglo-American jurisdictions, but also of corporate governance in general. It is undoubtedly true that some of the problems to hit financial institutions point up the deficiencies in corporate governance in Anglo-American jurisdictions.
The paper has considered, primarily, constituency statutes in the US and ESV under section 172 of the UK‟s companies legislation in order to assess whether they might be directing the US and the UK US and the UK
Importantly, apart from shareholders no other stakeholders in the US or the UK are able to enforce any possible breaches of duty on the part of the directors, Other mechanisms, beside constituency statutes and ESV will need to be enlisted to get the US and the UK, and other Anglo-American jurisdictions, closer to the approach employed in European stakeholder systems.
The view of Springer that the history of US constituency statutes teaches us that there is no “quick fix” in corporate law to ensure that the interests of stakeholders are considered, seems adroit and could be applied equally to ESV as it has been developed legislatively in the UK. If there is to be a move, or perhaps we should say a greater move, to stakeholderism it must involve more than just legislative directives and it will certainly take time”.