La lectura del indicado documento da la impresión de que la OPA formulada por Kraft sobre Cadbury se vio especialmente condicionada por un hecho concreto –la confirmación del anunciado cierre de una factoría en Somerdale, tras haber insinuado que podría seguir operando- que atrajo la atención inmediata sobre todo por su incidencia laboral, mientras que el problema de fondo era que la suerte de la empresa británica y de todos los intereses con ella vinculados estaban en manos de determinados accionistas institucionales. Este segundo aspecto es el que impulsa el movimiento reformador que afecta al Parlamento y Gobierno británico actuales y que lleva al Comité redactor del Informe a animar a sus sucesores –como es conocido, ya se han convocado elecciones en el Reino Unido- a continuar con la investigación iniciada. Basta con acudir a las Conclusions and recommendations (pp. 28-31), que terminan de la siguiente forma:
“19. The takeover of Cadbury by Kraft has highlighted a number of important issues in respect of the way in which foreign takeovers of UK companies are conducted. It has been the catalyst for a wider debate, both in Government and in the City, about how takeovers are conducted. In highlighting the Kraft takeover of Cadbury, we have contributed to that debate which now needs to continue, and with urgency. Time does not allow us to consider the wider proposals for reform in detail but it is clear that the Companies Act 2006 has not resolved these major issues in corporate governance. We urge our successor Committee to consider this Report as a starting point from which to conduct a detailed inquiry into these important issues and into the role of shareholders and managers of companies more generally. Recent experience of the behaviour of boards and shareholders in situations ranging from the fall of RBS to the Kraft acquisition of Cadbury indicate that it is time to reconsider many aspects of corporate governance. (Paragraph 76)”.
No debe ser ignorada tan autorizada recomendación para que se proceda a la revisión profunda de un modelo de gobierno corporativo que ha influído de manera decisiva en muchos otros ordenamientos y mercados europeos, comenzando por los españoles.
Como antes decía, el desarrollo de la operación ha dejado un amargo regusto también entre los parlamentarios británicos con respecto a la actuación de Kraft, a la que se dirigen numerosas advertencias para que cumpla con sus promesas sobre el futuro de Cadbury bajo su control, como forma de recuperar, según señala el Comité, su perjudicada reputación en el Reino Unido. Más allá de esas observaciones, las conclusiones que deben ser destacadas son, en primer lugar, las que contraponen una visión de la empresa de acuerdo con intereses realizables a corto plazo. Es lo que se titula Short-termism in decision-making y que se describe de la siguiente forma:
“15. We are deeply concerned by reports that the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft was ultimately decided by institutional investors motivated by short-term profits rather than those investors who had the company's long-term interests at heart. As a template for takeovers, this is not in the interest of UK companies or the UK economy. (Paragraph 62)
16. We welcome the Government's focus on the issue of 'short-termism' in decision-making on the future ownership of UK companies, and its efforts to engage with institutional fund managers as part of the process. However, we are sceptical about the extent to which informal engagement alone can instigate any fundamental change in institutional shareholder behaviour, in particular where there are financial incentives for fund managers and others to act in the short term. (Paragraph 63)”.
En segundo lugar, no extrañará que esa preocupación lleve a recibir de buen grado el anuncio de la revisión del régimen de las OPAs, sobre el que se encuentra en curso el proceso de consulta iniciado el pasado mes de febrero. Debe destacarse que también el Parlamento británico subraya que esa reforma no debe ser vista como un deslizamiento hacia un mayor proteccionismo:
“17. We welcome the fact that the Government is considering a review of the rules and legislation governing takeovers in the United Kingdom. We also welcome the current consultation by the Takeover Panel on its City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. Such consideration of the underlying issues must not be seen as protectionism against foreign takeovers but as seeking to ensure that all takeover activity, whether entirely domestic or by foreign companies, is conducted in the interests of the UK economy. (Paragraph 69)
18. While we have not taken sufficient evidence at this stage to enable us to come to a view on the merits or otherwise of extending the powers of intervention by the Secretary of State, we strongly believe that this issue should be considered as part of the wider debate on takeover regulations. (Paragraph 75)”.
El último punto a resaltar es el debate sobre el fortalecimiento de los supuestos en los que el Gobierno puede intervenir ante una OPA, o como lo formula el Informe, el Public interest test. La posición del secretario de Estado Lord Mandelson fue rotunda en contra de nuevos supuestos de intervención:
“73. Lord Mandelson remained unconvinced that providing Government with the power to intervene in the public interest was either necessary or desirable. He feared that:
in those circumstances a government's judgment and intervention could be too exposed to political lobbying and short-term populist pressures which are unable to make an assessment of long-term growth and value that might come from the move. It might give rise to capricious decision-making of one sort or another, depending on the ministers and their official advisers, and it can lead to a loss of transparency and a loss of predictability which at the moment makes the current UK regime open to investors from which, I just underline, we benefit a great deal.[91]
In his Mansion House speech, Lord Mandelson added that "Britain benefits from inward investment and an open market for corporate control internationally. A political test for policing foreign ownership runs the risk of becoming protectionist and protectionism is not in our interests."
Aunque ese criterio pareció ser compartido por el Comité, no dejó por ello de recomendar un debate futuro y específico al respecto:
“74. Any reform of takeovers in the United Kingdom has to recognise that foreign direct investment is of great benefit to the UK economy. We agree with the Secretary of State that an extension of his powers to intervene would come with a risk that the takeover process would be determined by political lobbying rather than economic fundamentals. However, we believe that the Government should consider how other countries act to protect key national assets while at the same time retaining a liberal investment climate. In particular, it should consider how aspects of Research and Development which are in the United Kingdom's national interest may be protected in the event of foreign ownership.”
Es obvio que la herida –la dulce rendición de los accionistas de Cadbury a la que me refería en enero pasado ha terminado siendo vista como una derrota amarga- sigue abierta. La reforma de la disciplina británica de las OPAs, bajo la influencia del cercano resultado electoral, permitirá comprobar si el que ha sido el mercado de control europeo más abierto sucumbe al proteccionismo o si, a pesar de los riesgos que esa opción conlleva desde un punto de vista político, mantiene su perfil actual.
Madrid, 25 de abril de 2010