La actualidad me lleva a volver con unas viejas conocidas de este blog como son las agencias de calificación o de rating. La actualidad pone de manifiesto una paradoja con respecto a estas agencias, como la que supone una generalizada crítica a sus conductas y a su influencia en la explosión de la reciente crisis financiera y, sin embargo, que sigan siendo una referencia esencial en la calificación crediticia de la deuda que puedan emitir tanto Estados como emisores privados. El observador poco avezado cuestionará cómo es posible que quienes son tan severamente criticados sigan mereciendo tanta atención. Algunos medios de comunicación deberían también revisar la circunstancia consistente en que sus columnas de opinión formulen tan severos reproches a aquellas agencias, mientras que sus páginas de información las convierten en protagonistas cualificados de las noticias que relatan los problemas de determinados riesgos soberanos o de aquellas empresas que en un entorno tan negativo como el actual se animan a emitir valores.
Dicho esto, estamos ante el inicio de una genuina reacción que trata de superar esa paradoja. Me refiero al documento elaborado y presentado el pasado 27 de octubre de 2010 por el Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera (Financial Stability Board-FSB-) sobre los principios destinados a las agencias de calificación (Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings).
Como es conocido, la crisis financiera ha generado una nueva estructura institucional en la Unión Europea y en el ámbito internacional, destinada a establecer medidas que permitan preveer nuevas crisis financieras y sobre todo atenuar sus efectos. Dentro de ellas figura el FSB, que supone un punto de encuentro de Bancos centrales, supervisores financieros y reguladores tanto europeos como de otros muchos países. La representación española corre a cargo del Banco de España y del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
Los principios han sido publicados por medio de la web del citado FSB, que me permito transcribir en sus postulados principales:
También recomiendo la lectura de la interesante opinión publicada en la edición del pasado viernes 29 de The Wall Street Journal por Patience Wheatcroft, titulada “Rating agencies are due a downgrande”, que llamaba la atención sobre esas contradicciones o paradojas que comenzaba esta entrada. Allí se señalaba:
Como es conocido, la crisis financiera ha generado una nueva estructura institucional en la Unión Europea y en el ámbito internacional, destinada a establecer medidas que permitan preveer nuevas crisis financieras y sobre todo atenuar sus efectos. Dentro de ellas figura el FSB, que supone un punto de encuentro de Bancos centrales, supervisores financieros y reguladores tanto europeos como de otros muchos países. La representación española corre a cargo del Banco de España y del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
Los principios han sido publicados por medio de la web del citado FSB, que me permito transcribir en sus postulados principales:
"- Principle I. Reducing reliance on CRA ratings in standards, laws and regulations
Standard setters and authorities should assess references to credit rating agency (CRA) ratings in standards, laws and regulations and, wherever possible, remove them or replace them by suitable alternative standards of creditworthiness.
- Principle II. Reducing market reliance on CRA ratingsBanks, market participants and institutional investors should be expected to make their own credit assessments, and not rely solely or mechanistically on CRA ratings.
- Principle III.1. Central bank operations
Central banks should reach their own credit judgements on the financial instruments that they will accept in market operations, both as collateral and as outright purchases. Central bank policies should avoid mechanistic approaches that could lead to unnecessarily abrupt and large changes in the eligibility of financial instruments and the level of haircuts that may exacerbate cliff effects.
- Principle III.2. Prudential supervision of banks
Banks must not mechanistically rely on CRA ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of assets. This implies that banks should have the capability to conduct their own assessment of the creditworthiness of, as well as other risks relating to, the financial instruments they are exposed to and should satisfy supervisors of that capability.
- III.2.a. Larger, more sophisticated banks within each jurisdiction should be expected to assess the credit risk of everything they hold (either outright or as collateral), whether it is for investment or for trading purposes.
- III.2.b. Smaller, less sophisticated banks may not have the resources to conduct internal credit assessments for all their investments, but still should not mechanistically rely on CRA ratings and should publicly disclose their credit assessment approach.
- Principle III.3 Internal limits and investment policies of investment managers and institutional investors
Investment managers and institutional investors must not mechanistically rely on CRA ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of assets. This principle applies across the full range of investment managers and of institutional investors, including money market funds, pension funds, collective investment schemes (such as mutual funds and investment companies), insurance companies and securities firms. It applies to all sizes and levels of sophistication of investment managers and institutional investors.
- III.3.a. Investment managers should conduct risk analysis commensurate with the complexity and other characteristics of the investment and the materiality of their exposure, or refrain from such investments. They should publicly disclose information about their risk management approach, including their credit assessment processes.
- III.3.b. Senior management and boards of institutional investors have a responsibility to ensure that internal assessments of credit and other risks associated with their investments are being made, and that the investment managers they use have the skills to understand the instruments that they are investing in and exposures they face, and do not mechanistically rely on CRA ratings. Senior management, boards and trustees should ensure adequate public disclosure of how CRA ratings are used in risk assessment processes.
- III.3.c. Regulatory regimes should incentivise investment managers and institutional investors to avoid mechanistic use of CRA ratings.
- Principle III.4. Private sector margin agreements
Market participants and central counterparties should not use changes in CRA ratings of counterparties or of collateral assets as automatic triggers for large, discrete collateral calls in margin agreements on derivatives and securities financing transactions.
- III.4.a. Supervisors should review the margining policies of market participants and central counterparties to guard against undue reliance on CRA ratings.
- Principle III.5. Disclosures by issuers of securities
Issuers of securities should disclose comprehensive, timely information that will enable investors to make their own independent investment judgements and credit risk assessments of those securities. In the case of publicly-traded securities, this should be a public disclosure.
- III.5.a. Standard setters and authorities should review whether any references to CRA ratings in standards, laws and regulations relating to disclosure requirements are providing unintended incentives for investors to rely excessively on CRA ratings and, if appropriate, remove or amend these requirements".
También recomiendo la lectura de la interesante opinión publicada en la edición del pasado viernes 29 de The Wall Street Journal por Patience Wheatcroft, titulada “Rating agencies are due a downgrande”, que llamaba la atención sobre esas contradicciones o paradojas que comenzaba esta entrada. Allí se señalaba:
“Many investors, however, would be much ruder about the role of the agencies than Mr Draghi and the FSB. They would point out that the agencies blithely attached triple-A ratings to the majority of mortgage-backed derivatives that the investment banks created on the back of sub-prime loans when, as has been amply demonstrated, they should have been marked with a skull and crossbones rather than a seal of approval.
The conflict of interest that characterizes the role of the agencies remains as much of an issue today as it did in the happy times before Lehman crashed: the client seeking a rating pays the agency to provide it. As Paul Stevenson, a former Moody's executive, told the Wall Street Journal after the crash: "The most recent problem is that the rating process became a negotiation."
...
But despite the criticisms that have been levelled at the agencies and their working practices, the system remains unchanged and, as has been seen in the excitement over their recent ratings of sovereign debt, they continue to exercise enormous power”.
Los principios son por el momento una formulación genérica pero no por ello menos interesante, que tienen como destinatarios a la variedad de sujetos que en el mercado de una manera o de otra orientan su actuación en función de los créditos de calificación que hayan podido aplicarse. Los principios apuntan por igual a los Bancos centrales, tanto con respecto a sus operaciones de mercado como a su función supervisora, a las autoridades encargadas de la supervisión prudencial, a quienes participan en los mercados financieros como gestores de inversiones o representando a inversores institucionales y, por supuesto, también suponen una orientación para los legisladores y reguladores.
Los citados principios van a provocar en los próximos meses una actuación normativa destinada a formular de forma más concreta las ideas que los inspiran.
Madrid, 2 de noviembre de 2010
