Es conocido que en Estados Unidos ya está en vigor el voto de los accionistas en materia de retribuciones, introducido por la Ley Dodd-Frank. En el siempre recomendable Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation aparecía una reciente entrada de Jeremy L. Goldstein titulada Say on Pay So Far, que ofrece una evaluación de la aplicación de esa novedad legislativa en las juntas generales de las sociedades cotizadas obligadas a observar la nueva votación.
Los párrafos iniciales explican cómo van las cosas:
“The most important development this proxy season has been the new requirement under Dodd-Frank that all public companies hold an advisory “say on pay” vote. The following are our observations on “say on pay” thus far this proxy season.
Results of General Vote. As of May 6, 2011, all but 15 of the 807 companies that have reported results with respect to their say on pay votes have received favorable votes, with over 2/3 of companies receiving more than 90 percent favorable votes”.
En la práctica societaria está teniendo una notable influencia el papel de las entidades que asesoran a los accionistas en relación con el sentido de su voto en esta materia:
“Influence of Proxy Advisory Firms. The recommendations of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) have had a measurable impact on voting results. ISS has recommended against say on pay proposals at approximately 12 percent of companies holding such votes. Of companies receiving unfavorable vote recommendations from ISS, 11 out of 60 that reported results as of April 29, 2011 failed to receive majority support. Companies receiving negative ISS recommendations that have nonetheless passed have generally done so with considerably lower margins than those receiving favorable vote recommendations. No company receiving a positive recommendation from ISS has failed to receive a majority support.
The influence of Glass Lewis, the other major proxy advisory firm, appears thus far to have been minimal. Glass Lewis has recommended against a strikingly high percentage of companies, and perhaps for this reason, has influenced voting results by approximately three percent or less. In our experience, many companies have determined not to address directly criticisms raised by Glass Lewis”.
Para conocer mejor la naturaleza y actividad de la influyente ISS, basta con acudir a su web.
La última y no menos importante mención afecta a cómo opera un voto negativo de la junta en materia de retribuciones con respecto a la responsabilidad de los administradores:
“Getting a “No” and Director Liability. While there has been heavy coverage of lawsuits deriving from negative say on pay votes at certain companies, courts will protect directors’ decisions so long as the directors act on an informed basis, in good faith and not in their personal self interest. In fact, the Dodd Frank Act expressly states that the shareholder vote “may not be construed” to “create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer or board of directors” or to “create or imply any additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or board of directors.” If a company receives a negative vote, it should consider the reason for the negative recommendation and, with the advice of an independent compensation consultant, consider whether it wishes to revise the practice. If a board follows appropriate procedures in its review process, there will be no legal liability. Directors therefore need not be deterred from paying executives in amounts and forms that they deem necessary or advisable to attract, retain and incentivize executives, regardless of the results of the “say on pay” vote. Indeed, doing so effectively is one of the highest priorities for any board of directors”.
Algunas de esas ideas cobran importancia ante la votación consultiva que las sociedades españolas están obligadas a introducir a partir de las modificaciones de la Ley del Mercado de Valores impulsadas por la Ley de Economía sostenible.
