Dentro de los materiales disponibles para el estudio del Derecho de sociedades, la European Company and Financial Law Review (ECFR) es el resultado de una feliz iniciativa de una pluralidad de editoriales y revistas nacionales, que ponen al alcance del lector trabajos que, con una perspectiva supranacional, nos permiten volver a algunos de los problemas fundamentales de la ordenación de las sociedades mercantiles. Esto resulta especialmente visible en el último número (ECFR nº 4, diciembre 2011), en el que encuentro dos contribuciones que, en relación con la cuestión del interés social o el fin de toda empresa, abordan dos temas en revisión permanente.
El primero tiene por autores a Andrew Keay y Hao Zhang (“An Analysis of Enlightened Shareholder Value in Light of Ex Post Opportunism and Incomplete Law”, p. 445 y ss.) que se adentra en la revisión del interés social orientado exclusivamente a la creación de valor para los accionistas, plasmada en el art. 172 (1) de la Companies Act 2006 (de lo que traté en una no lejana entrada). Dichos autores señalan:
“In the UK's Companies Act 2006 the traditional shareholder value principle was modified by the introduction of the principle of enlightened shareholder value, the primary source of which is section 172(1). Included in this provision is a requirement for directors to have regard for the interests of certain stakeholders when exercising their duty to promote the success of their company, and this article refers to this as the principle of due consideration. Based on the incomplete law framework, this article reveals that the principle of due consideration for stakeholders has the potential effect of checking ex post opportunism on behalf of shareholders and/or directors against non-shareholding stakeholders. As such, this principle could make a positive and value-adding contribution to all concerned simply because ex post opportunism of any kind is unfair and bad for business. Moreover, our analysis further suggests that if the potential effect of the principle of due consideration is to become real, a process of trial and error in the form of actual cases brought to, and tried in, the courts over time is required”.
Por su parte, el trabajo de Alexander Schall (“Corporate Governance alter the Death of the King-the Origins of the Separation of Powers in Companies”, p. 476 y ss.), busca las raíces históricas del reparto de poder en las grandes corporaciones:
“The separation of power in companies can be traced back to the sovereignty of the Kings. It first entered the stage with the chartered companies like the British East India Company. Their governance structure was based on the dualism of private investors and governors installed by the monarch. Companies survived the rise of democracy and demise of monarchy ensuing the age of enlightenment. They rose to glory in the modern world. Large listed companies are still managed by independent entrepreneurial officers. But who took the place of the good king watching over them? The fall of the thrones left a vacuum here. This lies at the bottom of the debate on shareholder vs. stakeholder supremacy. If we understand history, we might see new ways to answer for whose benefit the company should be governed”.
Madrid, 10 de abril de 2012
