La reforma de la legislación concursal
ofrece una interesante experiencia a partir del documento sometido a consulta
pública por el Gobierno británico el pasado mes de julio (consulta abierta hasta el próximo 10 de
octubre), titulado Red
Tape Challenge - changes to insolvency law to reduce unnecessary regulation and
simplify procedures. Los antecedentes de esta consulta se encuentran en un
programa de reformas impulsado por el actual Gobierno británico, que también
abarca el Derecho de sociedades, como espero tener ocasión de dejar constancia
en una próxima entrada.
En general, el documento parte de un
alto grado de satisfacción por parte de los protagonistas del procedimiento de
insolvencia. Sin embargo, existen una serie de cuestiones que deben ser objeto
de mejora y reducir los costes del procedimiento concursal. Un ahorro que favorecerá
a los acreedores, pues recibirán una mayor retribución en el marco de la
insolvencia. En otros aspectos, el documento llama la atención por su mal funcionamiento.
Es lo que sucede con las llamadas administraciones prepack —venta de un activo que se conviene antes de entrar en
administración concursal y que se ejecuta una vez iniciada ésta— a las que hice
referencia en una entrada
anterior:
“10. The Insolvency Service has also launched a review into the use
of prepack administrations, after concerns were raised about
their transparency and has recently published a report on the review of
insolvency practitioners’ fees by the independent reviewer, Emeritus Professor
Elaine Kempson of Bristol University. The report found that where
experienced, and usually secured, creditors are in control of proceedings, IP
fees are successfully monitored. Where the creditors controlling the fees are
unsecured and disparate, controls over fees are not working. The review
outlines recommendations for steps to improve trust in the professionals who
deal with businesses when they become insolvent, including providing greater
information for unsecured creditors to assess fees and simplifying the
oversight process by unsecured creditors. The Government will respond to the
report later this year”.
El documento tiene tres partes. La
primera se dedica a los cambios —que el propio documento califica como técnicos—
de la reglamentación que afecta a los que podríamos traducir como
administradores concursales (los insolvency
practitioners).
La segunda parte del documento se
centra en los cambios a introducir en el procedimiento concursal, al que se
reprocha su falta de adaptación a la realidad actual:
52. The UK’s insolvency law framework as we understand it today was
established in the second half of the 19th Century. Despite major revisions in
1986 and again in 2002, some of the processes in insolvency procedures are
essentially unchanged from these Victorian beginnings. Commerce,
communications and credit have all changed greatly over this period - some
parts of this insolvency framework, while important and relevant when first formulated,
may no longer be relevant for today’s insolvency market.
53. This document proposes a number of changes to how insolvency
proceedings operate, in three broad themes; · meetings of creditors; · communication and creditor engagement; and · improving insolvency processes”.
Finalmente, la tercera parte del
documento se ocupa de cómo deben informar los administradores concursales sobre
el comportamiento de los administradores de las sociedades insolventes. Es la
parte con un contenido más interesante y por eso me permito transcribir los
párrafos introductorios de las medidas que se proponen a este respecto, en una
materia llamada a seguir jugando un destacado papel en la legislación concursal
y en su aplicación:
170. These proposals would streamline the way that insolvency practitioners
(IPs) report on a director’s conduct in insolvent companies. This should
lead to more efficient investigation of miscreant directors and a reduced
burden on IPs.
171. The details of the proposals are outlined below and indicative
costs and benefits have been included within the Impact Assessment at Annex 8.
For each element of the proposal we are seeking views on the policy impact and
on likely costs and benefits. A full list of consultation questions is
contained at Annex 10.
172. The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA) provides
powers to the courts to make disqualification orders on the application of the
Secretary of State, or accept disqualification undertakings from company
directors (and in some circumstances other persons). Those who become directors
of companies should:
● Carry out their duties responsibly; and
● Exercise adequate skill and care with proper regard to the interests of
the company’s creditors and employees.
173. The majority of directors do this effectively, but the CDDA is a
powerful tool against those who abuse the privilege of limited liability.
The objective of the legislation is to protect business and consumers from
directors who are either incompetent or whose conduct, whether falling short of
dishonesty or actually dishonest, makes them unfit to act as a director of
another company for a period of time. It is easy to form companies in the UK
and there is no formal qualification for individuals who wish to become
directors. This is an important feature of an environment which encourages
enterprise, growth and free and open markets. However, the integrity of the
business environment needs protection to ensure that it is not abused;
otherwise it may affect the willingness of banks and suppliers to provide
unsecured credit and prove a danger to consumers. The disqualification regime provides
a check against such abuse.
174. Businesses, investors, employees and consumers must have confidence
that companies are acting fairly and that those who don’t will be identified
and appropriately sanctioned. Businesses and individuals who behave honestly
and responsibly should not be placed at a disadvantage by those who do not play
by the rules. Having an effective and trusted system for identifying and
dealing with poor business behaviour gives reassurance that we operate an even
playing field, and creates an environment in which honest entrepreneurs
are willing to invest in activities promoting growth and employment.
175. Disqualification is a civil, not criminal, matter. Around 2% of
directors involved in insolvent companies are disqualified each year. Unfit
directors are disqualified following and insolvency for between 2 and 15 years:
the average period is 5.9 years. Where possible, defendants are offered the
opportunity to provide undertakings before court proceedings are instigated.
176. We believe the current regime to be a proportionate response to
addressing director misconduct, although we do think that the process by
which IPs report misconduct could be streamlined”.
Madrid, 17 de septiembre de 2013
