En un amplio reportaje publicado en su edición del pasado 3 de febrero The New York Times analizaba con detalle la actuación de la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a lo largo de los últimos años con respecto a los expedientes abiertos por irregularidades a las grandes entidades de Wall Street. El planteamiento de partida es que la SEC habría actuado con una cierta tolerancia hacia esas grandes entidades:
“Even as the Securities and Exchange Commission has stepped up its investigations of Wall Street in the last decade, the agency has repeatedly allowed the biggest firms to avoid punishments specifically meant to apply to fraud cases.
By granting exemptions to laws and regulations that act as a deterrent to securities fraud, the S.E.C. has let financial giants like JPMorganChase, Goldman Sachs and Bank of America continue to have advantages reserved for the most dependable companies, making it easier for them to raise money from investors, for example, and to avoid liability from lawsuits if their financial forecasts turn out to be wrong.
An analysis by The New York Times of S.E.C. investigations over the last decade found nearly 350 instances where the agency has given big Wall Street institutions and other financial companies a pass on those or other sanctions. Those instances also include waivers permitting firms to underwrite certain stock and bond sales and manage mutual fund portfolios”.
Al justificar la concesión a entidades implicadas en investigaciones por posibles irregularidades en los mercados de valores de dispensas para poder seguir actuando, se apunta que esto tiene un valor singular para la operatividad de estas grandes entidades que en otras situaciones podrían verse paralizadas no sólo en su perjuicio, sino en el de muchos inversores y empresas que participan de uno u otro modo de su actividad:
“By granting those waivers, the S.E.C. allowed Wall Street firms to have powerful advantages, securities experts and former regulators say. The institutions remained protected under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which makes it easier to avoid class-action shareholder lawsuits.
And the companies continue to use rules that let them instantly raise money publicly, without waiting weeks for government approvals. Without the waivers, the companies could not move as quickly as rivals that had not settled fraud charges to sell stocks or bonds when market conditions were most favorable”.
Son interesantes las explicaciones de la SEC acerca del criterio adoptado en estos expedientes. La SEC considera que la concesión de estas dispensas y la autorización para que entidades que están siendo objeto de investigación sigan actuando en los mercados, forman parte de la defensa del mejor funcionamiento de los mismos:
“S.E.C. officials say that they grant the waivers to keep stock and bond markets open to companies with legitimate capital-raising needs. Ensuring such access is as important to its mission as protecting investors, regulators said.
The agency usually revokes the privileges when a case involves false or misleading statements about a company’s own business. It does not do so when the commission has charged a Wall Street firm with lying about, say, a specific mortgage security that it created and is selling to investors, a charge Goldman Sachs settled in 2010. Different parts of the company — corporate officers versus a sales force, for example — are responsible for different types of statements, officials say.
“The purpose of taking away this simplified path to capital is to protect investors, not to punish a company,” said Meredith B. Cross, the S.E.C.’s corporation finance director, referring to the fast-track offering privilege. “You’re not seeing the times that waivers aren’t being granted, because the companies don’t ask when they know the answer will be no.”
Others, however, argue that the pattern is another example of the government being too soft on Wall Street as it has become a much larger part of the economy in recent decades”.
The New York Times facilita algunas estadísticas y pone de manifiesto cómo la tendencia es claramente favorable a la concesión de estas dispensas:
“The Times analysis found 11 instances where companies that had settled fraud cases had actually lost the special privilege for fast-track stock or bond offerings, versus 49 times that the S.E.C. granted waivers from the punishment to Wall Street firms since 2005. The analysis counted 91 waivers since 2000 granting immunity from lawsuits, and 204 waivers related to raising money for small companies and managing mutual funds”.
Cierra la información la cita de un Profesor de Derecho de Mercado de Valores que me parece pertinente para entender la inspiración que puede motivar esta actuación aparentemente débil de la SEC frente a los poderosos actores de Wall Street, pero que enlaza con la propia función de la SEC a la hora de garantizar el funcionamiento de los mercados:
“Thomas Lee Hazen, a securities law professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, said that it is understandable that the S.E.C. might relax some potential sanctions on Wall Street firms — where it appears that lessons have been learned, or when a fine is thought to be sufficient punishment”.
The ripple effect of having a sanction that could shut them down or could seriously impede a company’s operations would seriously affect a lot of innocent customers,” he said. “It’s a very fine balance. That’s not to say that the S.E.C. is striking the balance properly. That is in the eye of the beholder”.
En cualquier caso, estamos ante una situación delicada, en la que destaca la firmeza del criterio de la SEC a la hora de explicar su actuación. No resulta fácil convencer, sobre todo a quienes se acercan a este tipo de situaciones con perjuicios, que un aparente trato favorable a grandes actores que han actuado de manera incorrecta, tiene como principal finalidad la defensa de intereses generales.
Madrid, 8 de febrero de 2012
