La tercera referencia a la experiencia del say-on-pay a través del blog The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, la he reservado para la más reciente información al respecto titulada "Negative Say on Pay Vote Litigation". En ella, Paul Rowe se hace eco de la primera sentencia dictada por un Tribunal federal con respecto a la situación vivida en un banco a partir de la votación negativa de los accionistas a la retribución pactada para los administradores.
Los aspectos fácticos y la fundamentación jurídica del caso la hacen especialmente atractiva:
“At issue in Davis was a decision by the compensation committee of Umpqua Holdings Corporation to pay increased compensation to certain executive officers for 2010 — a year in which the bank’s performance had improved and met predetermined compensation targets, but total shareholder return was allegedly negative. In a subsequent advisory “say on pay” vote, a majority of the shares voted disapproved of the 2010 compensation. Plaintiffs claimed that it was unreasonable for the Umpqua board of directors to increase compensation and that the shareholder vote rejecting the compensation package was prima facie evidence that the board’s action was not in the corporation’s or shareholders’ best interest”.
Los demandantes dibujaban por lo tanto un escenario de suertes económicas contrapuestas de administradores y accionistas, a la que se sumaba el voto negativo en la junta. Sin embargo, el Tribunal no lo consideró suficiente para entender que existía responsabilidad de los administradores:
“The court rejected both of plaintiffs’ arguments. Applying Delaware and Oregon law, the court determined that plaintiffs’ “essential position . . . that if a simple comparison reveals a level of compensation inconsistent with general corporate performance, the business judgment presumption is necessarily overcome, [is] a position that is unsupported by the applicable standards.” The court also held that the Dodd-Frank Act did not alter directors’ fiduciary duties and that a negative “say on pay” vote alone does not suffice to rebut the business judgment protection for directors’ compensation decisions. In so holding, the court expressly declined to follow a prior federal court decision which had denied a motion to dismiss in a “say on pay” action in the Southern District of Ohio, NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox, No. 11-451 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 20, 2011)”.
Madrid, 13 de febrero de 2012
