La discusión sobre el tamaño de los bancos
es uno de los temas vinculados con la recuperación financiera desde el año
2007. Desde entonces se viene cuestionando la conveniencia de que ciertas
entidades alcancen una dimensión tal que su crisis se convierta en “sistémica” es decir, amenace la
estabilidad del conjunto de las entidades que integran un mismo sistema
financiero. El tamaño se convertiría en un problema, aunque también se insinúa
su conversión en solución alegando que, esa misma circunstancia del tamaño
podía hacer que la supervivencia de una entidad quedara fuera de cuestión. “Too Big to fail” o “too big to fall” son expresiones acuñadas en este debate.
Parece razonable considerar que los
requerimientos a una entidad de crédito no pueden desconocer ese dato. Los
riesgos que afronta una entidad que limita su actividad a un ámbito provincial
o regional no son los mismos que acompañan a otra entidad con presencia en
varios Estados, en zonas económicas distantes y sometidas a criterios de supervisión
variados. Ese tratamiento regulatorio y supervisor se convierte en la vía para
intervenir y corregir el tamaño de determinadas entidades. Es lo que centra el
debate en Estados Unidos con respecto al desarrollo de la conocida Ley Dodd Frank
en este punto.
Un debate que enfrenta a las
Asociaciones bancarias de aquel país y a la Reserva Federal y que ha
evidenciado la carta remitida por las primeras. En el marco de las relaciones
entre la Reserva Federal y las entidades sometidas a su supervisión, las Asociaciones
han hecho pública una carta (¡de 161
páginas!) que contiene un reproche principal: la idea de que un tamaño excesivo
puede convertirse en un factor de riesgo para un banco. Tomo de la crónica de The Washington Post de 28 de abril de 2012:
“The
largest U.S. banks are accusing the Federal Reserve of attempting to misuse its
new regulatory powers to shrink financial giants under the misguided belief
that “big is bad”.
…….
Lobbying
groups representing the big banks are pushing back against a set of proposed
rules that the Fed issued in December to more closely scrutinize the firms and
rein in their risk-taking after the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
In a letter
sent Friday, the groups said the Fed is going too far and is proposing a set
of policies on credit exposure and capital standards that go against the intent
of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial oversight law.
…
The letter was
written by the Clearing House Association, the American Bankers Association,
the Financial Services Forum, the Financial Services Roundtable and the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. Comments on the December proposal are due Monday”.
He acudido a la web de la American Bankers Association, que tiene una
muy completa e interesante sección dedicada a lo que cabe enunciar como el
desarrollo normativo de la citada Ley Dodd Frank (Dodd Frank Tracker). Allí
puede consultarse la carta de 27 de abril de 2012 mencionada,
que es una extensa respuesta a las normas diseñadas por la Reserva Federal y
sometidas a consulta. Con respecto a la cuestión del “too big is bad”, me limitaré a transcribir el cuerpo de la
argumentación, que aparece en las páginas 16 y 17 de la misma:
“D. Numerous aspects of the Proposed Rules, along with regulatory
reform measures more broadly, appear premised on the “big is bad” belief that
size inherently is a major indicator of and contributor to systemic risk,
and assume that (i) “too big to fail” has not been addressed and cannot be
solved and (ii) forcing institutions to reduce their size will reduce systemic
risk without creating any loss of services or harm to customers or the domestic
or international financial systems or economies. In
our view, neither the belief nor the assumptions are correct.
Although some academics, legislators and even members of the Federal Reserve System have called for
large banks to be broken up, this was not the decision that Congress made in
Dodd‐ Frank.
27 Section 165 calls for enhanced prudential supervision of larger banks
rather than their break‐ up. Nonetheless, the Federal
Reserve appears to suggest that, contrary to Congress’ determination, it has
set a course to use Section 165 to achieve indirectly what it was not
authorized to address directly – that is, precipitate a reduction in the size
of large banks through size‐based regulation.
28 The Preamble asserts that the Proposed Rules “would provide
incentives for covered companies to reduce their systemic footprint . . .”
29 Two aspects of the Proposed Rules go directly to this point – (i) the
Proposed SCCL Rules’ 10% credit limit for major covered companies and (ii) the
G‐SIB Surcharge, as well as many of the indicators in the BCBS’s G‐SIB
Surcharge (which the Preamble indicates may be the basis for a surcharge on
covered companies or a subset of covered companies) that correlate with, and
largely appear to be proxies for, size.
30 We submit that an approach grounded in a “too big” or “big is
bad” concept is not only contrary to Congress’ intent but is misguided and
detrimental to a sound, strong banking system and a strong economy for at least
four reasons.
First, it is important for the American and global economies that
there be banks of all sizes, including at least some banks of significant size.
The variety allows the banking industry to serve
customers from the very smallest firms to the largest, including multinational
companies, with convenience that matches the needs of our customers, innovation
that all types of banks can provide, and financings to bolster economic growth
and job creation by meeting the demands of customers of all sizes.
31 Banks must mirror the economic system they are designed to serve. In
the 21st century, companies served by international banks compete in a global
economic system, exporting finished products, importing raw materials and
components, and establishing substantial operations abroad. Therefore, they
need banks that are competitive around the world and are able to meet quickly
and efficiently a wide range of financial needs, from treasury services to
overnight funding to trade finance to currency hedging. It is unrealistic
to believe that these needs can be entirely met by small banks or by hedge
funds or other members of the shadow banking system. There are many facets of
an institution, not just size, that determine its effectiveness, productivity,
risk and contribution to its customers and communities.
Second, the empirical record
contradicts the argument that size alone correlates to risk. Between
January 1, 2008 and March 31, 2012, the FDIC placed into receivership 430 banks
having aggregate consolidated assets of approximately $682 billion. Of those
receiverships, all but one of the banks had less than $50 billion of total
consolidated assets. Likewise, two of the countries with the most concentrated
banking systems, Canada and Australia, fared better during the crisis than
almost any other country.
Third, although the
Associations recognize that in many (but not necessarily all) cases, the
failure of a large bank is more likely to result in national systemic risk than
the failure of a smaller bank, we submit that this issue should be addressed by
an effective and credible resolution regime for large institutions. We believe
that such a regime has been created by the orderly liquidation authority of
Title II of Dodd‐Frank, which is supplemented by the living will requirements
and other Dodd‐Frank provisions.
As mentioned above, the Federal Reserve notes in the Preamble that
Dodd‐Frank takes a multi‐prong approach to mitigating the threat to financial
stability posed by systemically important financial companies, including the
orderly liquidation authority in Title II of Dodd‐Frank.
32 The Proposed Rules’ substantive provisions, however, with their
focus on size and restrictions designed to encourage reduction in size, fail to
give credibility to Title II.
33 Fourth, the Associations agree that taxpayers should never again
be required to bail out a financial institution and that “too big to fail” is
an unacceptable policy. This issue is, however,
addressed directly by Title II, which provides that stockholders are wiped out,
management replaced and creditors held responsible for any losses suffered in
the failure of a systemically important institution, and indirectly by several
other provisions of Dodd‐Frank and Basel III. In addition, unlike the
Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter XI reorganization arrangement, Title II provides
no option to a government‐ controlled liquidation. In addition, Dodd‐Frank amended Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act to eliminate the potential for single‐company special
financing”.
Madrid,
7 de mayo de 2012
