Completando esta relación de entradas sobre la retribución, me permito reseñar el editorial publicado hoy en The New York Times y titulado “Shareholders in Europe Demand Control”. El desencadenante de este comentario lo constituyen las distintas iniciativas adoptadas en Europa en este asunto y el limitado impacto que, en comparación, el problema retributivo ha tenido en el ordenamiento americano.
Reprocha el comentario editorial la tardanza de incorporar algunas medidas legislativas relevantes:
“While American laws do not require the level of control imposed by some European nations, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been too slow in carrying out the shareholder protections that are on the books. In the United States, shareholder votes on executive pay are nonbinding. That’s better than having no say at all, which was the case before the rules were changed in 2011 under the Dodd-Frank law. But a nonbinding vote still regards shareholders as advisers, rather than owners. And the S.E.C. has not yet proposed rules to implement a Dodd-Frank provision that requires companies to calculate and disclose the ratio of a chief executive’s compensation to the company’s median pay package. That data is crucial to gauging whether executive pay is excessive and how pay disparities affect company performance and the economy”.
Al propio tiempo, con relación al sector bancario se lamenta el influyente diario de medidas que considera erróneas en esta materia:
“This week, in a pre-emptive strike against rules that have not yet been written, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama, the ranking Republican on the Banking Committee, introduced a bill that would weaken the executive pay disclosures required by Dodd-Frank. That would be exactly the wrong way to go”.
Madrid, 8 de marzo de 2013