Es
conocida la técnica normativa seguida por los gobiernos británicos consistente
en preparar eventuales propuestas legales o reglamentarias por procesos de
consulta pública. A varios de esos procesos me he referido en el blog, tanto
por la relevancia que tienen los hechos analizados como por la influencia que
las soluciones que al final se adopten
terminan teniendo sobre otros ordenamientos.
En
esta ocasión me referiré al proceso de consulta, que terminó el pasado mes de
septiembre, sobre un documento que abordaba con brevedad asuntos de especial
relevancia. El documento sometido a discusión a partir del pasado mes de julio
se titulaba “Transparency & trust: enhancing the
transparency of UK company ownership and increasing trust in UK business”.
Su
propósito era tan sencillo como contundente: conocer quiénes resultaban ser los titulares reales de la
propiedad o del control de las sociedades británicas. Para ello, las medidas
contempladas se proyectan en primer lugar sobre la transparencia societaria con
respecto a su capital, de tal manera que toda sociedad conozca quiénes son sus
propietarios. A ese respecto las medidas cuya revisión se proponen son las siguientes:
“. We propose that the registry should hold information
on the beneficial owners (i.e. on individuals with significant
control or influence) of all UK
companies, but consider whether companies already subject to stringent
disclosure rules should be exempt.
. We intend to give all companies statutory tools to identify their beneficial
ownership; and we consider what additional
requirements might be required to ensure beneficial ownership
information on all companies is indeed obtained.
. We look at what
information should be provided to the registry; how frequently it should be updated;
and how to ensure that it is as accurate
as possible.
. We consider whether information in the registry
should be made public – noting the strong case for openness
but recognising that there may be concerns.
. We propose that the creation of new bearer shares should be prohibited;
and that existing bearer shares should be converted to ordinary registered
shares.
. We consider options to enhance transparency around
the use of nominee directors; and whether companies should be
prohibited from being appointed company directors, i.e. whether we should ban corporate directors”.
En segundo lugar, otras medidas
normativas que se están ponderando se dirigen contra los administradores que
incumplan sus deberes legales, a los que se convierte en destinatarios de las
siguientes propuestas:
“. Following the Parliamentary Commission on Banking
Standards’ recommendation that directors of banks should have a primary
responsibility to ensure the safety and stability of their firms, we
consider whether to amend directors’
statutory duties in key sectors such as banking and whether to allow sectoral regulators to disqualify
directors in their sector.
. We consider what additional factors the court might take into account in
director disqualification proceedings, such as the nature and number
of previous company failures a director has been involved in.
. We look at options to help creditors receive compensation when they have suffered from a director’s fraudulent or reckless
behaviour.
. We propose that the time limit for bringing disqualification proceedings in
insolvent company cases should be extended from two to five years.
. We propose directors who have been disqualified should
be offered education or training to equip them with the skills they
need to go on to run a successful company.
. We consider whether individuals subject to foreign restrictions should be
prevented from being a director of a UK company; and whether directors convicted
of a criminal offence in
relation to the management of an overseas company should be able to be
disqualified in the UK”.
El
proceso de consulta puede seguirse en la página
web gubernamental, en la que se indica que en breve se anunciarán próximos
pasos con vistas a una futura regulación.
Madrid,
11 de octubre de 2013
